INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the effects on child support collections of one major reform of the American private child support enforcement system--routine income withholding. Private child support refers to payments from a nonresident parent to the parent who resides with their children.
Routine income withholding is the requirement that the child support obligations of nonresident parents routinely be withheld from their paychecks.
The Family Support Act of 1988 requires all states to adopt routine withholding for all child support cases by 1994. The state of Wisconsin was the first in the nation to pilot and adopt a routine income withholding system. The system was piloted in ten counties in 1984 and adopted statewide in 1987. Data from Wisconsin' s pilot counties and a set of control counties are used to evaluate the effects of routine income withholding on child support collections.
Reforms of our child support system are worth evaluating for two reasons. First, in view of the fact that one-half of the next American generation will live apart from one of their parents during childhood, the quality of our child support institutions is important. ' Second, it is generally agreed that the system is inadequate.
Routine income withholding is but one of many recent, major reforms of the American system of enforcing private child support. Although the media have focused to a considerable extent on income withholding, there is no logical or empirical basis for believing that this is the single most important reform. Indeed, as explained below, there is good reason for believing that other reforms may be equally important. Our rationale for focusing on routine withholding is pragmatic: there are good data for evaluating its impact.
In the first section we briefly sketch the outlines of the American child support system, highlight its alleged weaknesses, summarize changes in federal and Wisconsin child support law that were designed to ameliorate these weaknesses, and review the literature on the expected effects of routine withholding. The second section describes the data.
The third section presents data on the extent to which withholding was implemented in the pilot and control counties on a routine basis. The fourth section presents estimates of the effects on child support collections of routine income withholding. The paper ends with a brief summary and conclusion.
THE AMERICAN CHILD SUPPORT SYSTEM
Until recently child support was a state and local matter. All states required divorced and separated parents to support their children. Prior to a series of Supreme Court rulings beginning in 1968, children born out of wedlock were not so well protected.2
The establishment and enforcement of private child support was characterized by judicial discretion. How much child support a nonresident parent was required to pay was left up to local judges. If the nonresident parent failed to pay, the resident parent--usually the mother--could take the nonresident parent back to court. The remedies available to the courts ranged from chastisement to jailing.
The system did not work very well. Whereas eight of ten divorced women had child support awards, only one of two separated women, and one of ten unmarried women had support awards. Altogether, 40 percent of children with living nonresident fathers still have no legal entitlement to child support . 3 How much nonresident parents were required to pay in child support varied dramatically from case to case. Families in similar circumstances were treated quite differently.4 On average, the awards were low. The mean award in 1985 was $2200.~ It is not clear whether the problem was due to initial awards being low or to the failure to increase awards over time.6 Only about half of resident parents with child support awards received the full amount of child support to which they were entitled, and about one-quarter received nothing. Finally, about half of families headed by single mothers potentially eligible for child support are poor, and nearly the same proportion are dependent on welfare. 8 Federal interest in child support grew as the caseload of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program grew and shifted from orphans to children with living absent parents. Although the first federal legislation to enforce child support was enacted in 1950 and there were further bills in 1965 and 1967, the 1975 The philosophy underlying CSAS is that parents are responsible for sharing income with their children, and the government is responsible for assuring that children receive the child support to which they are entitled. In addition to strengthening laws to establish paternity and child support awards, CSAS consists of three components. The proportion of their income that nonresident parents are required to share with their children is specified in law. The resulting child support obligation is withheld from wages and other sources of income in all cases just like income taxes and payroll taxes. The child is entitled to receive all that the nonresident parent pays, but no less than an assured benefit. If the nonresident parent pays less than the assured benefit, the state pays the supplement.
Wisconsin began implementing CSAS in late 1983, when DHSS published a percentage-of-income standard that courts could use to establish child support awards. The standard established child support awards of 17 percent of the nonresident parent's income for one child, and 25 percent, 29 percent, 31 percent, and 34 percent for two, three, four, and five or more children respectively. Between January and June 1984 ten Wisconsin counties began to use routine income withholding.
Legislation in 1985 made the percentage-of-income standard the presumptive child support obligation as of July 1987, allowed additional counties to adopt routine income withholding, and required all counties to do so as of July 1987. In addition, the legislation authorized DHSS to pilot the assured child support benefit in several counties. The assured child support benefit is now scheduled to be piloted in two counties in 1990.
After a series of minor reforms in the late 1970s and early 1980s, major federal child support legislation was enacted in 1984 and 1988, These reforms move the nation a considerable distance on the collection side toward a child support assurance system. They require states to adopt expedited procedures for establishing paternity and child support awards, provide for increased federal assistance for establishing paternity, mandate performance standards for state paternity establishment programs, and require states to obtain social security numbers from both parents when issuing birth certificates and to use these numbers in the establishment of paternity.
The states are required to adopt numeric child support guidelines that courts must use in determining child support obligations. While the 1984 legislation allowed the courts to ignore the guidelines, the 1988 legislation makes the guidelines the presumptive child support award. That is, judges may depart from the guidelines only if they construct a written justification which can be reviewed by a higher court. Furthermore, states are required to review child support awards at least every three years. 
DATA
Family court records involving divorce, separation, and paternity cases in which there was at least one child under age 18 were sampled from 20 Wisconsin counties. Ten of the counties had agreed to utilize immediate income withholding on a routine basis in all cases in which it was possible. Ten control counties were chosen based on county population, geographic location, divorce rate, unemployment rate, and average per capita income. Table 1 shows that on the whole the pilot and control counties are fairly well matched. The control counties have slightly higher population, number of divorces, per capita income, and unemployment rates.
Predemonstration data were collected for three years. Cases for the baseline sample included only those which entered the court system for the first time during the period from July 1, 1980 , through June 30, 1983 . I 3 Information on all these cases was collected until December 31,
1983.
The demonstration-period sample included cases which began one month after the implementation of routine withholding in each pilot county and at the same time in the "matching" control county. Case selection continued until May 31, 1986 , and collection of all case activity continued until January 31, 1987. Table 2 shows the implementation dates for pilot counties as well as for the control counties, all of which implemented routine income withholding later.
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In order to facilitate early evaluation of the demonstration, the sampling method for the second and third years of the demonstration period was altered slightly. Cases were considered chronologically from the beginning of the case-selection period instead of being randomly selected over the entire selection period. Sampling continued until a predetermined sample size was reached or until the end of the caseselection period. The selection criteria were otherwise unchanged.
The entire sample is further divided into 6 cohorts by the year during which the case began. Table 3 shows the dates of case selection, data collection, the resulting average number of months of data for each cohort, and the number of cases in each cohort.
Within each county, from about 30 to 150 cases were chosen in each cohort. In some small counties, all eligible cases were used. In In addition to information on child support payments, the court record includes some demographic information such as the number and ages of children, and income and employment information for both parents.
Unfortunately, much of the income and employment data is missing in the court record.
DEGREE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ROUTINE INCOME WITHHOLDING IN PILOT AND CONTROL COUNTIES
The effects of any policy depend in large part on the extent to which the policy is implemented. Similarly, an evaluation of a policy that is based on comparing outcomes in pilot and control counties will be reliable to the extent that the policy was implemented in the former but not the latter. Thus, the extent to which routine income withholding was implemented in both pilot and control counties is of great interest.
Full implementation of routine income withholding would entail issuance of an income withholding order to the employer or other source of income of the obligor at the outset of the child support obligation in every case where it was possible to withhold income. Unfortunately, because some obligors are self-employed and others are unemployed, it is not possible to withhold income in all cases at the outset of the child support obligation. Table 4 presents data on the potential for using withholding by county and by predemonstration and demonstration periods. In Table 4 , as in all that follow, only sole (legal) custody divorce and paternity cases with support orders are included and cases with private pay agreements are excluded.17 These and all other descriptive statistics in this report are weighted to account for the sampling scheme.
The assignable income sources identified in the court record are wages or salary paid by others and unemployment compensation. Any other source is assumed to be unassignable. Since the court record includes information on income source in only about three-quarters of the sample, the table gives the proportion of cases with missing information and two The first column for both time periods gives the proportion of all cases with missing data for income source for the nonresident parent.
It is clear that information on income source is collected when needed, since the proportion of cases with missing information on income source decreased dramatically in pilot counties during the demonstration period. Prior to the demonstration, pilot and control counties had about equal proportions of missing information, 25 percent and 24 percent, respectively. However, the proportion of missing information in pilot counties during the demonstration decreased to 14 percent while the proportion in control counties decreased to 18 percent.
The second column in Table 4 gives a conservative estimate of the proportion of cases with assignable income: the number of cases with a known assignable income source divided by the total number of cases (including cases without income information). This lower-bound estimate assumes that no cases with missing information on income source have an assignable income source.
The third column gives a more generous estimate of assignable income:
the number of cases with a known assignable income source divided by the number of cases with information on income source. This higher estimate is made assuming that the proportion of cases with assignable income among the cases with missing income information is equal to the proportion for the cases with known income sources.
The estimates of assignable income for pilot counties during the demonstration are probably the most accurate assessment of the potential for using routine withholding. Those figures suggest that in about 73 to 85 percent (the lower and the higher estimates) of divorce and paternity cases, the nonresident parent has income which can be assigned.
Given the experience of pilot counties, the higher estimate of assignable income may be a fairly accurate estimate of the level of assignable income. For the pilot counties, the proportion of cases with missing income source decreased by 11 percentage points, increasing the pool of cases with income source information. At the same time, the percentage of cases with assignable income (based on the conservative estimate) increased by 1 percentage point. This implies that the "new" cases with income information had about the same proportion of assignable income as the "original" cases.
The actual use of withholding is shown in Table 5 , by county and cohort. A case was defined as having a routine assignment if there was an income assignment issued within 60 days of the first court action with a child support order. Cases with an income assignment dated more than 60 days after the court action, or with no effective date in the court record, were not labeled as immediate assignments. 19 Table 5 shows that the use of routine income assignments has increased in both pilot and control counties over the court-record period. In pilot counties, the proportion of cases with assignments has increased from 4, 5, and 6 percent in the first 3 cohorts, to 57, 56, and 65 percent in the demonstration-period cohorts. Although the increase in assignments in pilot counties during the demonstration period is dramatic, levels remained substantially below the potential levels reported in Table 4 . Even by the third year, routine income withholding was not fully implemented in the pilot counties. A more serious problem is that use of routine withholding also increased in the control counties. Although control counties used routine withholding much less frequently than pilot counties in cohorts 4 and 5, the proportions (20 percent and 25 percent) were far in excess of zero and by the sixth cohort, control counties were using assignments in over half the cases. This widespread use of routine assignments in the control counties means that a simple comparison of collections in pilot and control counties would likely underestimate the effects of national implemention of routine income withholding.
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF ROUTINE WITHHOLDING
Child support payments, the key outcome variable in the analysis, are measured by (1) the ratio of dollars of child support paid to dollars of child support due, and (2) the ratio of months in which a child support payment was made to months in which there was a child support obligation. '' The former measures the collection rate of child support dollars, and the latter reflects the regularity and timeliness of payments. Both of these were calculated for the time between the first month of child support owed and the last month of court record data collected. These measures, averaged over the data period, are used to study the effects of withholding over the first few years after a support order. Monthly measures, described below, are later used to study differences in the impact of withholding over time.
The impact of routine income withholding on child support payments is measured in three different ways. The first is simply the difference in increases in child support payments between cases in pilot and control counties. The second is derived from the relationship between the extent of utilization of immediate income assignments in counties and child support payments in those counties. The third measure is the difference in child support payments between cases with and without immediate income assignments.
As discussed above, the difference in child support payments between pilot and control counties is expected to be an underestimate of the long-run effect of national implementation of routine income withholding.
There are two reasons for believing that extrapolating from the relationship between county use of routine withholding and county payment rates may overestimate the effects of routine income withholding. First, differences in the utilization of routine withholding across counties may be attributable to county differences in the proportion of cases in which assignments are possible. Second, the differences may reflect administrative discretion on the part of the courts, which is correlated with other efforts the courts make to enforce payments. For both reasons, counties with higher levels of routine withholding might have had higher payment rates even without the withholding.
The third measure may result in an overestimate of the impact because cases with routine income assignments may be better prospective payers.
Courts cannot issue assignments to those with no income. On the other hand, courts may be reluctant to issue assignments to well-known, influential members of their community. In about 80 percent of the cases we have data on and therefore can control for whether or not the nonresident parent has income which can be withheld. But that still leaves about 20 percent of the cases in which we cannot control for the absence of assignable income. On balance, therefore, it is likely that the difference between payments in cases with and without immediate assignments will be an overestimate of the effects of implementing routine withholding.
In short, the first measure of the impact of routine income withholding is likely to be an underestimate, while the second and third measures are likely to be overestimates. Table 6 presents the ratios of child support dollars paid to dollars owed and months paid to months owed by pilot county status and period, by county withholding level, and by case withholding status. All of the measures suggest that routine withholding has positive effects. The ratio of dollars paid to dollars owed increased by 7 percentage points in the pilot counties compared to only 4 percentage points in the control counties. The payment rates in counties which used routine assignments in less than 10 percent of their cases are nearly 9
percentage points less than the rates in counties that used assignments in over 60 percent of their cases. Also, payment rates for cases with The values of the dependent variables in these regressions are constrained to be between 0 and 100, so we estimate tobit regressions.
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The first policy variable is a dummy variable equal to one for cases opened in a county after the county became a pilot county and equal to zero for all other cases. The second policy variable is equal to the percentage of cases in a county using immediate withholding during the period in which a case got an award. The third variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the case had immediate withholding and zero otherwise. Each of the policy variables is used alone in separate regressions.
In addition to the policy variable, each regression also contains the following independent variables: a dummy variable equal to one if the case was a paternity case, a dummy variable equal to one if the case was one in which the mother rather than the father was the payer, a dummy variable equal to one if the payer had a reported income of zero, a dummy variable equal to one if the payer had reported assignable income, a dummy variable equal to one if the payer had missing income amount, the dollar amount of the payer's income (set to the mean if missing), and a set of dummy variables for the cohort and county of the case. The coefficients of the other independent variables are not very sensitive to which of the policy variables is included in the regression. Thus the full set of regression coefficients is presented in Appendix A and only the policy variable coefficients are reported in the tables. All of the policy coefficients in Table 7 are positive and, as indicated by the t-ratios in parentheses, all but one are statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better. Not surprisingly, the percentage increases in payments implied by the coefficients are much larger for the second and third measures of the impact of withholding than for the first. Based on the previous argument that the first measure is an underestimate and the second and third are overestimates of the impact of implementing routine income withholding, the estimates in Table 7 suggest that routine income withholding will increase child support payments by more than 11 percent and less than 30 percent.22
Note also that the effects on the ratios of months-paid to monthsowed are larger than those on the ratios of dollars-paid to dollarsowed. This makes sense insofar as payment irregularity is a problem over and above nonpayment. Routine income withholding should have an effect on the regularity of payments as well as on total payments. Furthermore, as Table 5 indicates, the proportion of cases in pilot counties in which an income assignment was implemented increased notably in the third year, which suggests that the estimated effects of withholding should be larger in the sixth cohort.
To test for the possibility that the effects of income withholding may have varied over time, monthly child support payment data were used to construct a variable equal to the number of months between the first month in which support was owed and the first month with no payment.
This variable was used to estimate a hazard rate, the probability of having no payment in a month, given there has been no previous month without payment. The model used for the hazard rate estimated here is a type of proportional hazard based on a Weibull distribution for the number of months until a nonpayment. This model allows the estimated hazard rate to either increase or decrease monotonically over time, but not to change directions. The independent variables are assumed to shift the hazard rate up or down proportionately over the entire spell length. The percentage change in the hazard for a unit change in the independent variable is eb -1, where b is the coefficient.
An additional policy variable was constructed to assess changes in the effectiveness of withholding as the county gained administrative experience. This variable, the county withholding experience, is equal to the number of months between the first month the county began routine withholding and the first month support was owed for the case. It is equal to zero for cases in the predemonstration period and for control county cases in the demonstration period. The coefficient estimated for the experimental county variable is positive but statistically insignificant. On the other hand, in the same regressions, the coefficient on the variable measuring county withholding experience is negative and statistically significant. Taken together, these coefficients suggest that nonresident parents who entered the court system in the pilot counties soon after the pilots commenced were somehat more likely to miss a payment than nonresident parents in control counties, but that as the pilot counties gained more experience with routine income withholding, income withholding became more effective.
The county withholding level and the individual case withholding coefficients are both negative, as are the accompanying pilot county experience coefficients. Note that the county experience coefficients in these regressions are half the size of the coefficient in the regression with the experimental county dummy. This makes sense in that presumably part of the effect of more experience is attributable to more widespread use of income withholding, which would be picked up by the county withholding level and individual case coefficients.
Survival rates, the proportions of cases expected to not yet have had a month with no payment, can be calculated from the estimated hazard rates. Figure 1 In short, the hazard models provide support for the hypothesis that routine income withholding became more effective over time.
In order to further explore this hypothesis and see if it holds up with respect to total child support payments as well as affecting the timing of the first delinquency, monthly data were also used to estimate while also controlling for the number of months the case had had an award. Both a dummy variable indicating any payment in a particular month and the ratio of dollars paid-to-owed in that month were used as dependent variables. The data for these analyses were created by randomly selecting one month out of the case history for each case.
This was done to decrease the number of observed months and to eliminate the possibility of correlation across errors for the months belonging to the same case. Table 9 presents the coefficients and t-statistics from probit equations on the chance of having any payment in the random month.
While the county withholding level and individual case withholding coefficients are positive and statistically significant, the experimental county coefficient is negative, though not significantly different from zero. Unlike the hazard model, none of the county withholding experience variable coefficients is significantly different from zero. Two even have the wrong sign. Table 10 presents the coefficients and t-statistics from tobit analyses of the ratio of dollars of support paid-to-owed in the random month. As in the probit analyses, none of the county withholding experience variables are significantly different from zero.
On the other hand, in a probit and a tobit (not reported in Tables 9 and 10) which included all three experimental variables, as well as the county experience variables, the county withholding experience variable coefficient was positive, though only in the probit was it statistically significant. Moreover, note in Table 10 
SUMMAEtY AND CONCLUSION
The U.S. child support system is undergoing profound changes. Recent federal legislation requires states to make substantial improvements in paternity establishment, enact numeric child support standards for determining child support awards, update those awards at least every three years, and adopt routine income withholding of all child support obligations. This paper focuses on only the last of these many changes in child support enforcement practices.
Ten Wisconsin counties began piloting routine income withholding in 1984. As originally conceived, the evaluation design consisted of a cross-county, before-after study. Data on child support obligations and payments and the use of income withholding were collected from the court records of 6400 child support cases which entered the court system between 1980 and 1986 in the 10 pilot and 10 matched control counties.
Because the control counties began to use routine income withholding in a large number of cases, the cross-county, before-after comparison understates the true effect of income withholding. On the other hand, because income withholding cannot be implemented in some cases in which payment is unlikely, and because we can control for such selectivity only imperfectly, a comparison of child support payments of those with and without income withholding orders is likely to overstate the true effect of routine withholding. The former comparison suggests routine income withholding increases child support payments by 11 percent whereas the latter suggests an increase of 30 percent.
Whether an increase of between 11 and 30 percent in child support payments is large or small depends upon the basis of comparison.
Relative to gains achieved by most program interventions, this one is quite substantial. Relative to the difference between current child support payments and estimated ability to pay child support--which implies potential gains of close to 400 percent--the gain is trivial.
What this suggests is that while routine income withholding will increase child support payments by a modest amount, it is no panacea.
Attention should now be turned toward evaluating the independent and interactive effects of other reforms such as increased paternity establishment, numeric child support standards, and regular updating of awards on child support payments. I3cases just entering the court system were collected in order to evaluate the effects of routine withholding from the start of the payment history. Routine withholding could also be used in cases returning to court, but the effects in this type of case are not evaluated here.
14Two control counties, Dodge and Juneau, implemented routine withholding before the end of case selection for cohort 6. They are treated as pilot counties for cohort 6 cases.
I5This information is from the Survey of Children, Income, and I6The extent of substitution in the pilot counties is not likely to have been large because, as described in the text below, withholding was not implemented in a large proportion of cases. It is likely that private direct payment cases were excepted. A telephone survey of resident and nonresident parents currently being conducted will provide additional information on the extent of direct child support payments.
I7~bout 3 percent of the cases had legal direct payment agreements, and about 20 percent had no child support order in the entire case history. In 30 percent of the cases there was a change in legal custody, joint custody, or custody granted to someone other than the p a r e n t s . These cases were excluded because of p o s s i b l e changes i n t h e payer.
1 8~h e income source information (and l a t e r income l e v e l information) i s taken from t h e d a t a f o r the f i n a l judgment i n cases i n which one had been issued. A f i n a l judgment i s issued i n divorce cases a t t h e time of property d i v i s i o n . Although t h e r e i s o f t e n a temporary c h i l d support order p r i o r t o t h e f i n a l judgment, income information i s o f t e n a v a i l a b l e only a t the time of t h e f i n a l judgment. For cases with no f i n a l judgment, t h e income information from the f i r s t c o u r t a c t i o n was used.
1 9~h e r e a r e a l s o cases i n which assignments a r e made a t a l a t e r a c t i o n i n response t o deliquency. These a r e excluded by looking only a t assignments made a t t h e time of the f i r s t o r d e r . Also, it appears t h a t i n some cases assignments a r e issued a t t h e time of t h e f i r s t o r d e r , b u t a r e n o t immediately s e n t t o t h e employers and t h e r e f o r e have no e f f e c t i v e d a t e . These may be a c t i v a t e d l a t e r i n t h e event of a deliquency i n payment, o r i f an unemployed nonresident p a r e n t l a t e r secures a job. These a r e n o t included i n our d e f i n i t i o n of r o u t i n e withholding. ' 'For awards expressed a s percentages, t h e exact d o l l a r amount owed i s unknown t o u s . For these c a s e s , t h e amount owed i s estimated a s t h e percentage ordered i n t h e l a s t c o u r t a c t i o n m u l t i p l i e d by the income amount s t a t e d i n t h a t a c t i o n . I f no income information i s a v a i l a b l e , t h e case i s dropped from t h i s a n a l y s i s .
Not a l l support orders mandate monthly payments ( e . g . , some use weekly or biweekly payments). Monthly equivalents were calculated for these cases.
"'The ratio of dollars paid-to-owed could be greater than 1 if the nonresident parent pays more than the ordered amount. However, taken as an average over the entire case life, it appears to be rare for the payments to exceed the amount owed. Therefore, the cases with high payto-owe ratios are likely to be data errors and are treated as censored at 100 percent by using tobit models with an upper point of truncation at 100. The monthly data used later have many cases with payments of more than the monthly amount owed, so there a single (lower) point of truncation is used.
he three experimental variables were also included in a single regression on the ratio of dollars paid-to-owed, and one on months paidto-owed. In those regressions, only the individual case withholding dummy coefficients were significant. The impact of withholding calculated from those regressions was slightly larger than in the regressions reported in the text.
